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Abstract
While most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legisla-
tion, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper
develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the
classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized
game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions.
The results are compared to the constrained-eﬃcient enforcement level. Our main
insights are: The regions’ desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than
their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative
market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is
harmonized at the North’s desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the
South may also beneﬁt in terms of long-run welfare.
Keywords: Endogenous Growth, Intellectual Property Rights, Trade, Dynamic
Game
JEL: F10, F13, O10, O30
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applies.1 Introduction
As trade of knowledge intensive goods accelerated during the last decades, patent and
copyright infringements have become a problem of highest concern. Although the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) speciﬁes a mini-
mum set of protection standards that members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
have to assent to, the enforcement of intellecutal property rights (IPRs) is still a source
of great international heterogeneity and further fuels the debate about the optimal pro-
tection level of IPRs in the world.
For example, the European Commission’s IPR Enforcement Report 2009 gives account of
serious problems with IPR-enforcement in a large number of mostly developing countries.
Complaints include that injunctions or criminal sanctions are often diﬃcult to obtain and
civil procedures are lengthy and burdensome with high uncertainty of outcomes. Involved
staﬀ is insuﬃciently trained, lacks resources to eﬀectively prosecute and convict violators,
and cooperation between authorities is insuﬃcient. For some countries the report assesses
even a lack of political will indicated by their opposing in-depth enforcement discussions
in international fora such as the WTO or the WIPO.1 Studying the distributional eﬀects
of TRIPs, McCalman (2001) argues that the agreement involves transfers from develop-
ing countries to developed countries due to stronger IPR protection. These transfers are
primarily determined by enforcement eﬀorts rather than the extension of the coverage
of patent protection. Thus, he reasons that the developing countries “will be more will-
ing to extend the coverage of patent protection as required by TRIPs, but may be less
willing to devote adequate resources to enforcement”. Further he predicted that “future
North-South tensions over intellectual property rights are likely to be centered around
enforcement issues rather than the sectoral coverage of protection oﬀered” (McCalman,
2001, p. 181).2
In response to this heterogeneity in IPR-enforcement, eﬀorts have been made in secret
negotiations under the title Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) with the aim to
harmonize international standards of IPR-enforcement. It is reported that a preliminary
agreement has been reached in October 2010 between several countries among them the
1See EU Commission (2009). A similar picture is drawn in the annual Special 301 Reports by the
U.S. Trade Representative, see Oﬃce of U.S. Trade Representative (2010).
2Other authors hold that even though the TRIPs-Agreement provides for mechanisms of law enforce-
ment, these are not always implemented by the member countries (see e.g. Cychosz (2003)).
2U.S. and the E.U.3 An ultimate objective of ACTA is that large emerging economies,
“where IPR could be improved will sign up to the global pact” (EU Commission, 2008;
Reuters, 2010).4
Inspired by these recent developments, this paper develops an endogenous growth frame-
work to study IPR-enforcement within the context of a classical North-South trade model.
Our analysis is characterized by the following features that distinguish our paper from
the previous literature. First, we assume equal treatment of all active patents in a region
with respect to IPR-enforcement at any point in time. Second, a government cannot
commit to IPR-enforcement for the indeﬁnite future but after each legislative term the
(new) government may adjust its enforcement eﬀorts as it sees ﬁt. Third, when setting
its policies, the government’s planning horizon is limited.
By the ﬁrst two assumptions, we intend to capture important aspects of IPR-enforcement.
With regard to the ﬁrst item, we argue that in reality IPR-enforcement depends on
whether or not a patent is active, ruling out the possibility that IPR-enforcement distin-
guishes active patents by, e.g., the year of invention.5 Second, while formal law may be
ﬁxed for substantial time horizons, the enforcement of laws can be changed more easily,
for example, by reallocating resources used for IPR-enforcement to other purposes. Our
third assumption reﬂects an important aspect of policy making in that governments are
not or not only motivated by fostering long-term welfare but are concerned with their
political ends.6
Incorporating these assumptions into a dynamic model with endogenous innovation ar-
guably makes the analysis of IPR-enforcement more realistic. However, it is also partic-
ularly interesting as it adds another area of tension resulting from the diﬀerent planning
horizons of the governments and the innovators. At the heart of our analysis is the
3The countries are: Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic
of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, and the U.S.
4In 2006, the European Union adopted the “IPR Enforcement Directive” to harmonize IPR-
enforcement levels among its members and eschew civil procedures that are “unnecessarily complicated
and costly or involve unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays” (European Parliament, 2004).
5It might be more realistic that enforcement distinguishes between a domestic product and an invention
of a foreign country. In this paper, we do not address this case and focus on national treatment only.
6For example, both, politicians’ monetary and non-monetary rewards may depend on the welfare
level during their term in oﬃce. According to a large literature on the political business cycle, the
welfare during the term in oﬃce also aﬀects the incumbent politicians’ reelection probabilities (Oudiz
and Sachs, 1985; Drazen, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). There is also a literature on oﬃce motivated
politicians, so called populists, who pander to the public by pursuing short-term policies to maximize
reelection chances. The concern of this literature is how to give incentives to implement projects that are
beneﬁcial in the long-term but come at costs in the short-run. See e.g., M¨ uller (2007); Gersbach (2004).
3governments’ classical trade-oﬀ between static eﬃciency and dynamic gains extended by
international externalities of IPR-protection with regard to R&D incentives and proﬁt
ﬂows.7 By choosing IPR-enforcement, the government has to trade oﬀ welfare today -
by incurring deadweight losses and R&D costs - against future welfare resulting from a
higher technological level. Without internalizing the full future beneﬁts of innovations,
an oﬃce-term motivated government may be more reluctant to bear the costs of great
innovative activity implying a substantial burden on current welfare.
As a consequence, we ﬁnd that in the decentralized equilibrium of the IPR-enforcement
game, the relation between the North’s IPR-enforcement level and its own research pro-
ductivity exhibits an inverted U-shaped course. When the research capacity is low, the
dynamic gains of IPR-enforcement dominate and the enforcement level increases with a
higher productivity of research. However, if the research capacity is very high, the cur-
rent R&D costs are so large that the government reduces IPR-enforcement in response
to an even higher research productivity. As the South does not engage in R&D, it ne-
glects research expenditures but considers its inﬂuence on the R&D activity in the North.
Consequently, the South’s equilibrium IPR-enforcement increases monotonically with the
North’s innovative capacity. The oﬃce-motivated government in the North may, hence,
possess lower incentives to enforce IPR than the one in the South when the North’s R&D
productivity is very high, while the opposite is the case for low levels of R&D productiv-
ity. Further we ﬁnd that a country’s relative market size positively aﬀects its equilibrium
IPR-enforcement level. The intuition is that a larger country’s impact on R&D incentives
is relatively higher and therefore its incentive to freeride on the other region’s IPR-eﬀorts
are lower.
By analyzing the regions’ preferred harmonized IPR-enforcement levels, we seek to shed
light on potential clashes of interest in international negotiation rounds. We compare these
enforcement levels with those chosen in the decentralized equilibrium and relate both to
the constrained-eﬃcient solution reﬂecting the maximum welfare the two governments
can achieve given they cannot escape their political-economy constraints.
Both, the North’s and the South’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement levels are higher
than their respective equilibrium choices. While the South’s preferred harmonized enforce-
ment level is independent of relative market sizes, the one of the North typically exhibits a
declining relationship with its relative market size. This contrasts with the decentralized
equilibrium where the North’s equilibrium IPR-enforcement level is positively associated
7The trade-oﬀ between static eﬃciency and dynamic gains was ﬁrst discussed by Nordhaus (1969).
4with its relative market size. This result suggests that small innovative countries show
large diﬀerences between their desired harmonized levels supported in negotiation rounds
concerning global IPR-enforcement and their own equilibrium choices.
Further, we ﬁnd that relative to the constrained-eﬃcient solution the regions’ IPR-enforce-
ment levels in the decentralized equilibrium are too low. By contrast, the North’s desired
harmonized enforcement level is typically higher than the constrained eﬃcient one while
that of the South is lower. As a consequence, the regions’ growth rate is highest when
the harmonized IPR-enforcement level of the North is implemented. Would this rate of
growth come at the expense of welfare in the South? According to a numerical exer-
cise, our analysis suggests that the South may well gain in terms of aggregate long-run
welfare by adopting the North’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement level given a suﬃ-
ciently productive R&D sector in the North. However, the opposite holds for low research
capacities in the North.
The literature has approached questions regarding the international protection of IPR
from two perspectives. On the one hand, from a macroeconomic, endogenous growth
perspective which treats the regions’ IPR-enforcement as exogenous and examines its
eﬀects on the resulting growth rate and on welfare (Helpman, 1993; Kwan and Lai, 2003;
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2006; Futugami and Iwaisako, 2007). On the other hand,
from a rather microeconomic, industrial organization perspective that explicitly takes
IPR-enforcement as endogenous, but precludes long-run dynamics (Chin and Grossman,
1990; Deardorﬀ, 1992; Maskus, 1990; Diwan and Rodrik, 1991; Lai and Qiu, 2003). This
paper establishes a uniﬁed framework which combines these two perspectives and therefore
allows to consider endogenous choices of IPRs as well as aspects of economic growth and
welfare.
As we do, the seminal paper by Grossman and Lai (2004) employs a framework of variety
expanding innovations, however, considers a one-shot game with respect to IPR-protection
and does not allow for endogenous long-run economic growth. The one-shot game in
Grossman and Lai (2004) is equivalent to a game where governments are able (1) to decide
on the IPR-protection level of each vintage of inventions separately and (2) to fully commit
to it in the future. This implies the theoretical possibility that at a particular point in
time, all diﬀerent vintages of active patents enjoy diﬀerent levels of IPR-enforcement.
This is precluded in our set-up. Additionally, our paper takes a complementary approach
to the one by Grossman and Lai (2004) by incorporating governments’ political economy
considerations. Our work is also related to Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa (2008) who present
5an endogenous growth model with endogenous strength of IPR-enforcement. This paper
diﬀers from ours in that it considers a closed economy. Moreover IPR-enforcement there
is not a choice variable of the government but characterized by private investments of
ﬁrms to hire lawyers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model. We discuss
the setting in which both regions choose their national IPR-enforcement decentrally in
Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze the preferred harmonized enforcement levels of the
North and the South. Section 5 compares the desired harmonized enforcement levels
and the decentralized equilibrium with the constrained-eﬃcient solution. We present
implications for welfare in Section 6 and provide a summary and conclusions in Section
7.
2 The Model
We consider two regions, n and s, that diﬀer with respect to their innovative capacity.
Region n, which we also refer to as the North, produces blueprints, that are licensed out
to Region s, the South. For simplicity, we assume that there is no innovation activity
in Region s.8 Our analysis builds on a variety-expanding-growth framework where at
time t a patent is enforced with probability ωj,t in Region j = s,n.9 For simplicity, we
assume that imitation is costless. Thus, an imitated intermediate is supplied under full
competition and operating proﬁts are zero. Both economies are populated by a measure
Lj of households each inelastically supplying one unit of labor in each period. There is
no population growth and time moves in discrete steps t = 0,1,2,...,∞. In the following,
we ﬁrst introduce the model for given levels of IPR-enforcement in both regions and then
discuss the governments’ problems concerning their IPR-enforcement choice.
8In a model where both regions innovate but Region s possesses lower innovative capacity and without
perfect knowledge spillovers between the regions, it can be shown that the ratio between the number of
innovations in Region s and Region n tends to zero. A proof is available upon request.
9As our explicit focus is on IPR-enforcement, we assume that each innovation obtains a patent of
inﬁnite length and neglect the issue of patent breadth. Without changing our qualitative results, it would
be possible to assume a ﬁnite patent length and a certain patent breadth, e.g., given exogenously via
TRIPs. The regional governments then possess some leverage on determining the strength of enforcement
reﬂected by ωjt.
62.1 Production








where Aj represents a productivity measure, Lj is labor input, N is the measure of diﬀerent
intermediates invented in the North, and xj(i) stands for the amount of intermediate i
used in ﬁnal-good production in Region j = n,s. The elasticity of substitution between
the diﬀerent intermediates is denoted by α ∈ (0,1).
Each intermediate good i is produced by a monopolist or an imitator. The production of
one unit of intermediate i requires one unit of the ﬁnal output. We choose ﬁnal output as
the numeraire. Hence marginal production costs of intermediates are equal to unity. The
symmetric equilibrium on the market for intermediates induces equal prices and demand
for all types of intermediates, such that pm,j(i) = pm,j = 1/α, xm,j(i) = xm,j for all
protected intermediates and pc,j(i) = pc,j = 1, xc,j(i) = xc,j for all imitated intermediates.
Demand in Region j for protected intermediates is xm,j = λjα
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reﬂecting the ”eﬀective” market size of Region j. Hence, a small economy in terms of its
population may constitute a large eﬀective market when its productivity level in ﬁnal-
good production is suﬃciently large and vice versa. Patent holders located in the North







1−α > 0. If an
intermediate is copied and, hence, sold at the competitive price pc,j = 1, demand increases
to xc,j = λjα
1
1−α, and operating proﬁts in j at time t are zero.
Given the enforcement level 0 ≤ ωj,t ≤ 1, the number of protected intermediates at time
t is ωj,t ∗ Nt, while [1 − ωj,t] ∗ Nt of the intermediates are imitated. Aggregate output in
Region j writes therefore as
Yj,t = λj










Additionally considering that xm,j = α
1






1−α−1) < 0 represents the deadweight loss due to monopolistic competition.10
10Notice that for ωj,t = 1, i.e., full patent protection, we obtain the standard Romer (1990) production




1−αxc,j       
xm,j
)α. The case without patent protection, ωj,t = 0, yields the highest
possible output from a static perspective: Yj,t = AjL
1−α
j Ntxα
c,j. Of course this undermines incentives to
invest in R&D.
72.2 Research and development
The North performs R&D in search for new designs (blueprints) of intermediate goods.
Here, we use a lab equipment speciﬁcation assuming that ﬁnal output (which incorporates
both labor and intermediate goods) enters as the main factor of production into the R&D
process. A measure Le
n << Ln of the population in the North has the entrepreneural








where ηt denotes the number of new inventions at time t and δ reﬂects the research pro-
ductivity or the quality of the research infrastructure. Alternatively, δ can be interpreted
as a measure of the entrepreneurs’ human capital. That is, the higher the level of hu-
man capital, the lower δ implying that lab-equipment can be used more productively. In




A new blueprint invented in period t can be employed in ﬁnal-good production from
t + 1 on and it receives a patent of inﬁnite length. Accordingly, the expected value of an










As Et[V (i)] is the same for all i, we will use the abbreviation Et in the following. Op-
timality requires that marginal costs for an additional invention must equal its expected






11The assumption that both, research productivity (or human capital) as well as the current technology
stock play a positive role for innovative output and are complementary to a certain extent is standard in
the literature. For example, in Romer (1990, p. 86), the aggregate stock of designs evolves according to
˙ A = δaHAA, where A is the stock of designs, HA is human capital and δa is a productivity parameter.
The assumption of decreasing returns on the ﬁrm and industry level with respect to R&D expenditures
has been supported empirically, e.g., by Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Hall et al. (1988). On the macro
level, the probably most important source of decreasing returns in R&D can be seen in an increased
probability of duplicative research through an increasing number of both rivals and expenditures, even
though the R&D process as such may be driven by large spillovers (Amir, 2000; Kortum, 1993; Klette and
Kortum, 2004). In a related line of argument, it is possible to think of plausible limits in transforming
an ever increasing stock of new ideas into usable knowledge for production (Weitzman, 1998).From an
aggregate perspective, decreasing returns may also reﬂect heterogeneity in the cost of research projects.
A similar argument can be found in Scotchmer (2004, ch. 11). Convex costs of R&D are also widely
used in the industrial organization type literature on IPR-protection (see e.g., Chin and Grossman, 1990;
McCalman, 2002; Lai and Qiu, 2003).
8and the aggregate stock of technological knowledge evolves according to






2.3 The household’s and the government’s problem
Concentrating on the governments’ IPR-enforcement decisions, we keep the individual






where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor.12 For the entrepreneurs in the North, the maxi-
mization problem reduces to the decision of how much of their income (labor income plus
the proﬁt ﬂows from their active patents) to invest in R&D and how much to consume
in each period. This problem is solved by (5). The households in the North without
entrepreneurial skills as well as the households in the South consume their labor income
in each period.
As motivated in the introduction, we intend to examine the eﬀects of politically motivated
short-sighted governments that do not fully take into account the long-run consequences
of their actions. The simplest way to incorporate this aspect into our model is to assume
that at any time t the governments in both regions choose an optimal enforcement level






subject to (6). Cj,t stands for aggregate consumption in country j at time t. As men-
tioned in the introduction, we make two additional assumptions concerning the gov-
ernments’ IPR-enforcement choices. First, governments can only commit to a level of
12Note that this implies that
1−β
β is the rate of time preference which, in equilibrium, must be equal
to the interest rate.
13Oudiz and Sachs (1985) argue that restricting the planning horizon of the government as we do it here
is a natural way to incorporate short-sightedness of governments into dynamic macroeconomic models.
Our particular modelling choice regarding the planning horizon of the government could be motivated via
short-lived households (with two-period lifes). A minority of the households is altruistic and entertain
research labs. At the cost of further complexity, we could interpret output Y as sophistcated machinery
that can be used either in research or to produce the consumption good via technology F(Lu,Y ), where Lu
denotes unskilled labor. Under the assumption that unskilled workers constitute the non-altruistic (short-
sighted) majority and Lu and Y are complements, there exists a conﬂict between R&D expenditures and
machinery for the production of the consumption good. Concerning IPR-policy, a re-election motivated
government would then adopt a the short-sighted view of the majority of unskilled workers.
9IPR-enforcement for the subsequent period, i.e. ωj,t+1, but not for the indeﬁnite future.
For example, while in oﬃce at time t, the government can increase training eﬀorts of staﬀ
responsible for the prosecution and conviction of imitators of protected intermediates. A
larger number of trained oﬃcials will then be available in t+1 to enforce the laws on IPR.
Similar arguments apply with respect to other resources or capacity building necessary
for eﬀective enforcement. Second, we assume that the enforcement level chosen by the
government in Region j applies to all active patents in the same way.
In a typical period t, the sequence of events can be summarized as follows. First,
intermediate-good production and ﬁnal-good production take place given the technol-
ogy stock Nt and IPR-enforcement level ωj,t. Then the government announces the level
of IPR-enforcement ωj,t+1 and thereafter the entrepreneurs decide how much to invest in
R&D. Finally, the households consume.
At any time t aggregate consumption in the North as well as the dynamics of the tech-
nology stock (6) depend on the R&D expenditures in t which reﬂect the entrepreneurs’
expectations about future IPR-enforcement beyond t+1. Let us denote these expections




τ=t+2 and the vector of IPR-enforcement that will ﬁnally
realize by Ωt+2. When deciding on IPR-enforcement, ωj,t+1, the governments have ex-
pectations about the entrepreurs’ expectations Ω′
t+2, which we refer to by Ω
g
t+2, and on
how the entrepreneurs adapt their expectations in response to the governments’ enforce-
ment choices for period t+1, ωj,t+1. Even under the assumption of rational expectations,
this structure allows for a plenitude of subgame-perfect equilibria. Here, we intend to
minimize complexity by focussing on equilibria that satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1
(i) At any time t, the entrepreneurs’ expectations about future IPR-enforcement Ω′
t+2
do not depend on ωj,t+1.
(ii) Each government j takes Nt, ωn,t,ωs,t, (ωk,t+1,k  = j) and item (i) as given and
maximizes (8) subject to (6) according to its expectations Ω
g
t+2. Governments do
not condition their choices on the history of play before time t.




Two remarks are in order. First, in Item (ii) we have used parenthesis for the other region’s
IPR-enforcement choice at time t, because this is taken as given by each government
in the game where IPR-enforcement is chosen decentrally. Later we consider regimes
10where a government is able to determine both regions’ enforcement levels in which, of
course, the other region’s IPR-enforcement is not taken as given. Second, given Item
(i) of Assumption 1, the entrepreneurs’ expectations can only be rational if the future
governments’ optimal enforcement choices do not depend on the technology stock. This
is the case as we will see below.
3 Decentralized Enforcement of IPRs
In this section, we examine the strategic interaction between governments with respect to
their national levels of IPR-enforcement. We focus on unique subgame-perfect equilibria
(SPE) in steady state satisfying Assumption 1. In the next two subsections, we study
the South’s and the North’s maximization problems and describe the SPE in steady state
thereafter.
3.1 The problem of the South





τNτλs [Y + ωs,τ(D − P)], (9)




1−α > 0 reﬂects the contribution of an intermediate to ﬁnal output net








1−α < 0 represents
the deadweight-loss factor net of production costs for intermediates. The expression
ωs,τNtλsP indicates the proﬁts accruing to the technology owners in the North. The
South’s objective (9) and the constraint (6) reveal the government’s trade-oﬀ between
static eﬃciency and dynamic gains: Stronger IPR-enforcement involves higher deadweight
losses and proﬁt ﬂows to the North while it increases the incentives to innovate in the
North (via Et) and thereby leads to higher productivity of domestic ﬁnal-good production
in the South. Solving the South’s optimization problem, the reaction function along the




























(D − P) +
βλsP
2δ [Y + ωs,t+1(D − P)] = 0.
11where λ ≡ λn+λs denotes the eﬀective size of the world market and ∆ ≡ δ
λ represents the
North’s research capacity relative to the aggregate eﬀective market size. This notation
turns out to be very convenient for separating the eﬀects of the aggregate world market
size, λ, from those of the relative eﬀective market sizes,
λn
λs. In light of (10), we establish
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (IPR-enforcement in South)
(i) The steady-state level of IPR-enforcement in the South is a strategic substitute to
IPR-enforcement in the North.
(ii) For ωn given, the South’s IPR-enforcement increases with the eﬀective market size of
the South, λs, and with the research productivity of the North – i.e., it is decreasing
in ∆.
The result in Item (i) originates from the fact that IPR-enforcement constitutes a global
public good as far as R&D incentives are concerned. With respect to Item (ii), the South’s
impact on the value of a patent becomes larger when it exhibits a larger eﬀective market
size, thereby reducing its incentive to free-ride on the North’s protection levels.15
3.2 The problem of the North
In contrast to the government’s objective in the South, the government in the North
additionally accounts for R&D expenditures, E2
t/4δ, and proﬁt ﬂows from the South to



























= 0 . (12)
A marginal increase in ωn,t+1 involves higher R&D costs in period t lowering current
consumption. This is reﬂected by the ﬁrst term in (12). The second term represents the
15Note that the South’s level of IPR-enforcement may be perfect, that is ωs = 1. This can be the case
if either ∆ is suﬃciently low, i.e., the research productivity in the North relative to the eﬀective world
market is large or the relative size of the eﬀective market in the South is very large implying a small value
of λn
λs . Further notice that positive consumption levels at any feasible level of IPR-enforcement require
Y > P − D. Consequently, the ﬁrst term in brackets of (10) is greater than 1 (i.e. Y
D−P < −1).
12marginal increase in the deadweight loss in period t + 1.16 Finally, the marginal beneﬁts
are captured by the last summand of (12) which multiplies the additional number of
innovations, Nt+1 − Nt = Nt
βλnP
2δ , induced by the marginal increase in IPR-enforcement,
with the future welfare gains per innovation as expressed by the term in brackets.


















where ˜ E = E/λ. Note that ˜ E only depends on the relative eﬀective market sizes, λn/λs,
but not on λ. Equation (13) implicitly deﬁnes the reaction function of the North, ωr
n(ωs).
In the ﬁrst term of (13), we combined the R&D costs and the deadweight losses of the
innovations created in period t, while the second term represents the deadweight losses
resulting from enforcing the patents created before time t. The government’s future
welfare gains induced by a marginal increase in the North’s level of IPR-enforcement are
still captured in the third term. In the appendix, we show:
Lemma 1
(i) There exists a unique economically sensible solution ωr
n(ωs) to Rn(ωn,ωs) = 0.
(ii) The North’s reaction function ωr
n(ωs) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave on
the relevant interval [0,1].
Lemma 1’s implication of strategic substitutability between ωn and ωs from the perspective
of the North is not obvious. A higher ωs implies higher proﬁt inﬂows from the South to
the North for all active patents and for those intermediates that are developed in t. On
the one hand, this increases the North’s incentives to tighten its level of IPR-enforcement.
On the other hand, the global public good problem with respect to R&D-incentives acts
to reduce IPR-enforcement in the North when the South increases its enforcement level.
As veriﬁed in the proof of Lemma 1 the public good aspect dominates. Hence, national
levels of IPR-enforcement are strategic substitutes to foreign enforcement levels.
16Note that, by assumption, the marginally higher IPR-enforcement applies to all active patents in





The reaction functions of the North, ωr
n(ωs), and the South, ωr
s(ωn), possess only one
potentially economically meaningful intersection which we denote by (ωx
n,ωx
s).17 However,
the intersection may lie outside of the feasible set [0,1]2. To account for corner solutions,
let us introduce the notation ˆ z ≡ max{min{z,1},0} and ˆ z(x) ≡ max{min{z(x),1},0} for
a constant z and a function z(x), respectively. Now we are able to characterize the levels
of IPR-enforcement in a steady-state SPE, (ωe
n,ωe
s).
Proposition 2 (Steady-State SPE)
In steady state, there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the IPR-enforcement
































The proof can be found in Appendix A.2. At this point two remarks are interesting.
First, there is the possibility of zero IPR-enforcement in the South, i.e., ωe
s = 0. In
this case, the model switches structurally to a closed-economy setting. As the regions’
IPR-enforcement levels are strategic substitutes, trade opening between North and South
lowers the enforcement level of the North provided that ωe
s > 0. Second, trade opening in
the South enhances the level of IPR-enforcement compared to autarky since the South –
even though it does not conduct research – internalizes the eﬀect of its IPR-enforcement
level on R&D-incentives in the North.
3.4 The roles of research capacity and market sizes
In our model, the enforcement levels in the steady-state SPE are entirely determined by
the ‘primitives’ α,β,∆, and λn/λs. Our interest centers on how the decentralized steady-
state equilibrium is aﬀected (1) by the research capacity of the North and the global
eﬀective market size captured by the parameter ∆ and (2) by the relative eﬀective market
17A formal proof can be found in Appendix A.2.
14size of the North and the South, λn
λs, for a given aggregate market size, i.e. for a given
∆.18
We begin with ∆. Perceiving ωe
n and ωe
s as functions in ∆, we obtain
Lemma 2




n is strictly concave in ∆.
(ii) ωe
s is strictly convex in ∆.
In the proof given in the appendix, we ﬁrst show that ωe
n is strictly concave in ∆ in an
interior equilibrium. As far as IPR-enforcement levels in the South are concerned, ωe
s is
a declining line in ∆ if there is no IPR-enforcement in the North. For positive protection
levels in the North, the South’s enforcement level must be strictly below this line as the
protection level of the North acts as a strategic substitute. Consequently, the protection
level of the South becomes convex since IPR-enforcement in the North is concave.
To fully characterize the comparative-statics, we have to account for corner solutions.
There exists a critical level ∆0
j, for both regions individually, such that for any ∆ > ∆0
j
country j is not willing to enforce IPRs.19 This implies for the situation ∆0
s < ∆0
n – i.e.,
the South’s critical threshold level is smaller than the one of the North – that for all
∆0
n > ∆ > ∆0
s the South does not oﬀer protection in equilibrium while the North acts as
in autarky. The opposite holds true in the situation where ∆0
n < ∆0
s. In the following, we
focus on the case ∆0
s < ∆0
n and deﬁne ∆0 ≡ ∆0
s as the smallest threshold corresponding to
the South. This condition seems to match reality more closely compared to the opposite







Note that the right-hand side of (14) is smaller than one. Hence the inequality is always
satisﬁed if λn > λs, but it also holds if λn is not too much smaller than λs. In the
next proposition, we characterize the comparative statics of equilibrium IPR-enforcement
levels with respect to changes in ∆ given that condition (14) holds.
18For example, an increase in the North’s market size leaving that of the South unaﬀected would
increase both, the world market size and the relative market size of North. Consequently, the eﬀect on
the IPR-enforcement level would be a combination of the two eﬀects. For this reason, it seems natural
to isolate the resulting eﬀects from each other.







Figure 1: Steady state equilibrium pairs (ωe
n,ωe
s) dependent on ∆, with α = 0.3;β =
0.3;λ = 1;λn = 0.445.





s is positive and strictly decreasing with ∆ for all ∆ < ∆0, and ωe
s = 0 for all
∆ ≥ ∆0.
(ii) For interior values, ωe
n exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with ∆. ωe
n is
identical to its value in autarky for ∆ > ∆0.
(iii) There exists a unique value ∆x < ∆0 where ωe
n = ωe
s. For all interior equilibria,
ωe
n < ωe
s if ∆ < ∆x, and ωe
n > ωe
s > 0 if ∆ > ∆x.
The proof can be found in the appendix. Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 1. In-
tuitively, ωe
s declines with ∆ because a larger value of ∆ = δ
λ (i.e. declining research
capacity (δ ↑) or declining eﬀective world market size (λ ↓)) implies a lower lever exer-
cised by the South’s IPR-enforcement on innovation incentives in the North. The convex
shape for interior values of ωe
s arises, as discussed earlier, from the public-good aspect
of IPR-enforcement on R&D-incentives. In contrast to the literature, our model predicts
an inverted U-shaped relation between the North’s level of IPR-enforcement and ∆. An
intuition for this result can be gained from scrutiny of the North’s reaction function (13)
for a given ωs.20 Using the implicit-function theorem, the partial derivative of ωr
n(ωs)
20The eﬀect of ∆ via ωs changes ωe
n quantitatively but does not aﬀect the inverted-U shape of ωe
n in







∂ωn . As we show in the ap-
pendix the denominator is negative, implying that the sign of
∂ωr
n
∂∆ is identical to the one of
∂R(ωn,ωs)
∂∆ , which may be positive or negative. On the one hand, a decline in ∆ involves an
increase in the number of innovations, (βP/2∆). On the other hand, it increases current
R&D expenditures and future deadweight losses (ﬁrst term in (13)). Additionally, wel-
fare per innovation (term in brackets in (13)) declines when ∆ becomes smaller because
next period’s R&D expenditures increase, as well. The beneﬁts of a marginal increase
in ω (the higher number of innovations) are not increasing as strongly when ∆ becomes
smaller as the the marginal costs (additional R&D-costs and deadweight losses), implying
an inverted U-shaped relation between ωe
n and ∆.
It is important to emphasize that this result is not an implication of convex R&D-costs
at the research lab level. The central assumptions behind this result are that the gov-
ernment does not take full account of the future beneﬁts of R&D and enforces all active
patents at the same strength. It is straightforward to show that in the case of a far-sighted
government which could commit to a particular enforcement level for each vintage over
the entire lifetime of its patent (such as in Grossman and Lai (2004)), a monotonically
declining relationship between ωn and ∆ would result.21 Similarly, in a one shot game
where the government determines the level of IPR-enforcement once and for all. The gov-
ernments’ limited time horizons and the necessity to enforce all active patents at the same
strength result in diﬀerent weights between the marginal beneﬁts and the marginal costs
of IPR-enforcement in the government’s ﬁrst-order condition. While the government can
only inﬂuence the proﬁt ﬂows and deadweight losses in the next period, the induced addi-
tional costs for R&D that accrue in the current period account for the entire net present
value of future proﬁts. The latter cost term takes the dominant role for small values of ∆
leading to an increasing relationship between IPR-enforcement and ∆ in the North. To
the contrary, the South’s decision problem is independent from R&D-expenditures, such
that the dynamic gains from the perspective of the South are monotonically increasing
with the research productivity of the North. As a consequence of this result, we may ﬁnd
lower IPR-enforcement levels in the North than in the South for suﬃciently small ∆, and
vice versa if ∆ is suﬃciently large.
Before turning our attention to the comparative statics with respect to relative market
sizes, λn
λs, we verify that in interior equilibria, the global rate of growth on the balanced
∆.
21A proof is provided upon request.
17growth path increases when the research capacity becomes larger, even though the North’s
level of IPR-enforcement may be declining at low values of ∆.
Proposition 4 (Eﬀect of ∆ on steady-state growth)
In interior equilibria (ωe
n,ωe
s) ∈ (0,1)2, the global steady-state growth rate strictly de-
creases with ∆.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.5. Finally we turn to the role of relative market
sizes for IPR-enforcement and economic growth. We focus again on interior equilibria.
Proposition 5 (Eﬀect of relative eﬀective market size)
In interior equilibria (ωe
n,ωe
s) ∈ (0,1)2, both countries’ IPR-enforcement levels increase
with their relative eﬀective market sizes. The steady-state growth rate is unaﬀected by
the relative eﬀective market sizes.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.5. Governments tighten IPR-enforcement in re-
sponse to an increase in their relative market share, since their relative levers in inducing
innovations increase. The region becoming relatively smaller by a marginal change in
the relative eﬀective market sizes reduces its IPR-enforcement level in a symmetric way
such that the global discounted proﬁts to be earned in expectation by an entrepreneur
in the North remain unchanged. As a consequence, the steady-state growth rate remains
unaﬀected. In sum, a change in a country’s eﬀective market size will aﬀect the growth
rate only through its eﬀect on the total world market size but not via a change in the its
relative market size.
4 Harmonization of IPR-enforcement
As discussed in the introduction, some countries make an eﬀort to harmonize IPR-
enforcement globally, e.g., via ACTA. In this respect, it is interesting to explore which
harmonized IPR-enforcement level the governments of Regions n and s would like to im-
plement given it had the power to do so. These enforcement levels may shed light on the
diﬀerences that need to be bridged in international negotiation rounds.22
22In the formal bargaining problem, the governments’ most preferred IPR-enforcement levels are the
points on the boundary of the feasible set which will realize if the respective regional government possesses
all the bargaining power. The threat point of the problem is the decentralized equilibrium as described
in the previous section. How close to governments’ ideal enforcement levels the bargaining outcome will
be depends on the relative bargaing power, of course.
18In our context harmonization means that both regions are subject to the same level of











j,τ represents the harmonized IPR-enforcement level preferred by Region j. The
evolution of the technology stock is again captured by (6), where discounted proﬁts are









With respect to the governments’ decision problems, we keep with the two major assump-
tions that there is only commitment on IPR-enforcement for one period and all active
patents have to be enforced at the same strength. One may argue that an agreement in
the international arena could serve as a commitment device, partially at least. However,
particularly where IPR-enforcement is concerned rather than formal laws, there is also
the possibility of renegotiations after each period. Here, we stress the latter point.23 This
also allows us to directly compare the results to the ones in the decentralized setting.
4.1 Desired harmonized enforcement level of the South
We begin with the optimization problem of the government located in the South which















subject to (16). Along the balanced growth path, we obtain as the preferred harmonized














23Allowing for commitment over a longer ﬁnite time horizon would increase the desired levels of IPR-
protection but would not change the characteristics of the problem qualitatively.
24Note that we still assume that the government is able to adjust IPR-enforcement after each period.
Consequently, in period t the South determines the optimal harmonized enforcement level ωh
s,t+1 tak-
ing as given the rational beliefs of the entrepreneurs about future governments’ optimal decisions (see















19Compared to the decentralized protection game (see Equation (10)), the desired harmo-
nized enforcement level of the South is larger, since the marginal beneﬁts in terms of
R&D incentives increase due to the larger market size in the optimization problem (λ
versus λs) for which enforcement is determined. At the same time, the marginal costs in
terms of deadweight losses in the South and proﬁt outﬂows to the North remain as in the
decentralized setting. In addition, ωh
s is independent from relative market sizes. Equation
(18) reveals that ωh
s increases with the North’s research capacity but is independent of the
relative eﬀective market sizes. We summarize these observations in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 (Desired harmonized IPR-enforcement of the South)
The preferred harmonized level of IPR-enforcement of the South increases with the North’s
research productivity and the global eﬀective market size but is independent of the relative
market sizes.
4.2 Desired harmonized enforcement level of the North
The objective of the government in the North includes proﬁt inﬂows from the South which
are – contrary to the decentralized IPR-enforcement game – subject to the harmonized
























































where ˜ Eh =
β
1−βPωh
n. The next proposition veriﬁes that (20) possess a unique economi-
cally sensible solution and describes the eﬀects of changes in ∆ and the relative market
sizes, λn
λs, on the preferred harmonized enforcement level of the North.
























= 0. As the North controls proﬁt inﬂows from the South, the
second-order condition for the problem described above may be violated, if λs
λn is large enough, such that
the marginal gains from proﬁt inﬂows to the North always overcompensate the marginal R&D costs and
deadweight losses in the North. Then the North opts for complete protection ωh
n,t = 1, ∀t. In the follow-
ing, we consider the more interesting case where the second-order condition for a maximum is satisﬁed,
such that λn
λs > P−2D
P > 1, since D < 0.
20Proposition 7 (Desired harmonized IPR-enforcement of the North)
There exists a unique economically sensible solution to the North’s optimization problem.
The North’s desired harmonized level of global IPR-enforcement depends on its research
productivity and its relative eﬀective market size as follows:
(i) If λn
λs < −P





D, then there exists a unique value ∆m > 0 where for all ∆ > (<)∆m, the
North’s desired level of IPR-enforcement, ωh
n, decreases (increases) with ∆.
(iii) There exists a unique value ¯ ∆ > 0, where for all ∆ > (<)¯ ∆, the North’s desired
level of IPR-enforcement, ωh
n, decreases (increases) with λn
λs.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.7. Concerning the eﬀects of research capacity and
global eﬀective market size (∆), Proposition 7 distinguishes two cases. In the ﬁrst, (i),
an increase of global IPR-enforcement involves less additional deadweight losses in the
North (−λnD) than additional proﬁt inﬂows from the South (λsP). Thus, the only costs
associated with IPR-enforcement are the research costs, and the North’s main objective
in enforcing global IPRs is to reap proﬁts from the South. The latter is cheaper when
∆ increases as this implies lower aggregate R&D expenditures. As a consequence, there
is a positive relation between ωh
n and ∆. In the second case, (ii), the proﬁt inﬂows from
the South are lower than the deadweight losses in the North incurred by an increase in
global IPR-enforcement. In this scenario, the North’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect
to its most preferred harmonized enforcement level shows a similar structure as the one
in the decentralized game with the diﬀerence that a part of the North’s deadweight losses
are compensated for by higher proﬁt inﬂows from the South. As a consequence, we also
obtain an inverted U-shaped relationship between ωh
n and ∆ for which the same intuition
as provided in the discussion of the decentralized setting can be applied.
Contrary to the decentralized enforcement game, the relative eﬀective market size exhibits
a non-monotonic eﬀect on the North’s desired level of IPR-enforcement as indicated by
Item (iii) of Proposition 7. The reason is that changes in the relative eﬀective market
sizes change the weights attached to the diﬀerent components in the North’s objective
function. As an illustration consider the eﬀect of an increase of λn/λs given λ on the

























Figure 2: Desired harmonized IPR-enforcement of the North (solid lines) in response to
an increase in
λn
λs (gray versus black solid line). Dashed line: desired harmonized IPR-
enforcement level of the South. Parameters: α = 0.3;β = 0.35;λ = 1;λn = 0.78.










Apparently, the marginal change of the North’s periodic welfare with respect to changes
in its own relative market size (22) is structurally equivalent to the periodic welfare of the
South and is independent of research expenditures since Eh
t depends only on the eﬀective
world market size λ, which remains unchanged. Intuitively, a larger eﬀective market size
of the North gives higher weight to ﬁnal-good production and deadweight losses in the
North and lower weight to the proﬁt inﬂow from the South. That is, an increase in the
eﬀective market size of the North gives higher weight to those components of the North’s
periodic welfare that are also present in the South’s. Hence, the desired IPR-enforcement
level of the Northern government approaches the one of the South when λn/λs increases.
However, it will never coincide with ωh
s, since ωh
n represents the solution under autarky for
λs = 0 with R&D expenditures still being positive. A graphical illustration is presented
in Figure 2, where the solid gray line reﬂects the desired harmonized enforcement level
of the North for a lower relative market size λn/λs compared to the dark solid line. The
dark solid curve is closer to the dashed line which represents the desired harmonized
enforcement level of the South.26
26Formally this can be seen as follows. As a direct consequence of the arguments above, it follows that
the derivative of Rh
n(ωh
n) with respect to λn/λs is equivalent to the South’s ﬁrst-order condition in steady
22According to this intuition and Proposition 7 (iii), we infer:
Proposition 8 (North’s and South’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement)




s if ∆ < ¯ ∆, and ωh
n > ωh
s if ∆ > ¯ ∆.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 2 and a proof is provided in the appendix.27
Proposition 8 implies that when the research productivity in the North is very large
(∆ suﬃciently small), the South may even desire a higher harmonized enforcement level





s. Then the North’s desired harmonized enforcement level increases
with the relative market size of the South while its equilibrium enforcement level in the
decentralized game declines.28 Consequently, a relatively larger Southern market widens
the gap between ωh
n and ωe
n. The opposite is true for the South: Its desired harmonized
level is independent from the relative market sizes, while the equilibrium level ωe
s increases
with the South’s relative market size. This implies that the diﬀerence between ωe
s and ωh
s
becomes smaller, since ωe
s < ωh
s as argued in Section 4.1.
In particular, with regard to the ACTA-negotiations our results suggest that small coun-
tries located in the North strongly favor tighter IPR-enforcement as they beneﬁt most
from higher proﬁt inﬂows from the South, with the latter incurring the correspondingly
large amount of deadweight losses.





















j (D − P)),












As (23) is decreasing with ωh
j , and given that ∆ is such that the desired value of IPR-enforcement of the
North is higher than that of the South – i.e., ωh
n > ωh

















< 0. This argument follows directly from the implicit-function
theorem. The opposite holds true if ωh
n < ωh
s (see Figure 2).
27Recall that ˆ ωh
n ≡ max{min{ωh
n,1},0}. Moreover, we changed the set of parameters for illustrative
purposes of interior solutions without altering the qualitative results. The set of parameters employed
in the previous section violates the second order condition of the North, such that the North would
choose full protection, i.e. ωh
n = 1. The parameters used in this section imply a corner solution in the
decentralized enforcement game, such that the South opts very fast for zero protection and the North
behaves as in autarky.
28Scotchmer (2004, p. 336 and 346) notes that during the TRIPS negotiations countries with smaller
markets were in favor of stronger protection.
235 Constrained Eﬃciency and Comparison of Regimes
What would be the maximum welfare that governments could achieve by coordinating
their respective levels of IPR-enforcement, but given their inability to escape their po-
litical economy constraints? We have in mind a global government choosing pairs of
(ωn,t+1,ωs,t+1) so as to maximize the sum of the regional governments’ welfare. Since
expected proﬁts depend only on the path of Φt = λnωn,t + λsωs,t and not on particular
values of ωn,t and ωs,t, we can rewrite the maximization problem of a global government
in terms of Φt.29 Hence the constrained eﬃcient pairs of IPR-enforcement, (ωn,t+1,ωs,t+1),











Y λ + D(λnωn,t + λsωs,t)






















Sidestepping the multiplicity of optimal solutions to the global government’s problem,
we focus on the (unique) constrained eﬃcient harmonized solution where the optimal
enforcement level ωp is implemented in both regions and solves (24). In this case, we
obtain Φ = λωp and (24) coincides with the ﬁrst-order condition of a closed economy
with eﬀective market size λ.
The constrained eﬃcient solution serves as a theoretical point of reference to which we
relate the enforcement levels obtained from the previous sections. The diﬀerent levels of
IPR-enforcement are depicted in Figure 3. The regions’ preferred harmonized and the
constrained-eﬃcient enforcement levels intersect at ¯ ∆ such that ωh
n > ωp > ωh
s, if ∆ > ¯ ∆,
while ωh
n < ωp < ωh
s, if ∆ < ¯ ∆.
The intuition behind this result can be described as follows: for λs → 0 and λn → λ the
preferred harmonized enforcement level of the North must equal the constrained-eﬃcient
solution (ωh
n = ωp) since the world economy consists of the North only. According to
Item (iii) of Proposition 7, ωh
n increases with λs/λn if ∆ > ¯ ∆, but declines if ∆ < ¯ ∆.30
Hence, starting from the situation where λs = 0 and λn = λ, an increase in λs/λn turns
29An equivalent result is obtained by Grossman and Lai (2004).
30Intuitively, in the former case the motive of gaining proﬁt ﬂows from the South dominates while in








Figure 3: Comparison between the regimes: non-cooperative enforcement, eﬃcient solu-
tion and preferred harmonized enforcement levels. Parameters: α = 0.3;β = 0.4;λ =
1;λn = 0.78.
ωh
n counterclockwise around ¯ ∆ implying ωh
n > (<) ωp if ∆ > (<) ¯ ∆. As discussed in the
previous section, for a declining ratio λs/λn, ωh
n approaches ωh
s but will not coincide with
it in the limit λs/λn → 0. Accordingly, Proposition 8 implies ωh
s < (>) ωp for ∆ > (<) ¯ ∆.
As a consequence, the constrained-eﬃcient IPR-enforcement level is in between the desired
harmonized enforcement levels of the North and the South for all ∆  = ¯ ∆.






> 0. Moreover, in the situation where λn = λ, ωe
n coincides with the constrained-
eﬃcient enforcement level ωp.31 An increase in λs/λn thus implies ωe
n < ωp. According
to our previous discussion, it further involves ωe
n < ωh
n for ∆ ≥ ¯ ∆. However, this relation
may not be satisﬁed for all ∆ < ¯ ∆.32 We summarize our observations in the following
proposition.
Proposition 9 (Comparison of IPR-enforcement regimes)
(i) At ∆ = ¯ ∆ the regions’ preferred harmonized enforcement levels correspond to the
constrained eﬃcient harmonized IPR-enforcement, i.e., ωh
s = ωh
n = ωp.
(ii) For ∆ < ¯ ∆, ωh
s is above and ωh
n below the constrained-eﬃcient level of IPR-
31The reason is that if λn = λ, the decision problem of the North is entirely described by the constrained
eﬃcient problem.
32In this case both, ωe
n and ωh
n decline with λs/λn. Conditions under which ωe
n < ωh
n for all ∆ ≥ ¯ ∆
will be provided upon request.
25enforcement. For all ∆ > ¯ ∆, ωh
s is below and ωh
n above the constrained-eﬃcient
level of IPR-enforcement.
(iii) The decentralized equilibrium level of IPR-enforcement in the North, ωe
n, is always
below the constrained-eﬃcient level and lower than the North’s desired harmonized
enforcement level if ∆ ≥ ¯ ∆.
The world economy is arguably best described by ∆ > ¯ ∆. As stated in Proposition 9
and depicted in Figure 3, the preferred harmonized enforcement level of the North ex-
ceeds the constrained-eﬃcient level which in turn is higher than the preferred harmonized
enforcement level of the South. Since the steady-state growth rate is a linear function
of IPR-enforcement, the implementation of ωh
n would be most conducive for economic
growth.33 On the other hand, for small values of ∆, the decentralized game yields the
lowest aggregate incentives for R&D and consequently the lowest steady-state growth
rate. Interestingly, the latter may even fall below the resulting growth rate if the South’s
desired harmonized level of IPR-enforcement were adopted globally.34
6 Welfare
Whether the South should adopt the IPR-standards of the North is one of the most
debated questions in the political arena.35 However, it is not clear to which IPR-standards
of the North the discussion refers to: the equilibrium choice of the North or its desired
harmonized enforcement level. Figure 3 in the previous section suggests that even though
the diﬀerence between the North’s and the South’s equilibrium choices can be substantial,
the South’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement level can be quite close to the North’s
equilibrium choice. Hence, a binding adoption of the North’s equilibrium enforcement
level might not be such a contentious issue as opposed to the implementation of the
North’s most preferred harmonized protection level of IPRs. We therefore explore the
welfare eﬀects in the South resulting from the implementation of ωh
n along the balanced
growth path as compared to the implementation of ωh
s.36 Aggregate welfare in the South




34This can be the case when λs/λn is large (however still satisfying (14)). Using the set of parameters
employed in this section, we obtain ωe
s = 0 (even for ∆ < ¯ ∆). The North behaves as in autarky where
ωe
n < ωp < ωh
n for ∆ > ¯ ∆ = 0.005. The resulting growth rate per year for ∆ = 0.009 implying ωe
n ≈ 0.85
and ωh
s ≈ 0.75 equals ge ≈ 3.6% and g(ωh
s) ≈ 3.8%.
35See e.g., Lai and Qiu (2003).
36We do not consider welfare eﬀects in the North, which are very intuitive: The implementation of ωh
s
in the North causes welfare losses there relative to the implementation of ωh
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1−β and j = n,s.37 The results are depicted in Figure 4.
The gray solid line reﬂects the South’s overall welfare, ¯ Ws(ωh
s), obtained from its gov-
ernment’s preferred harmonized enforcement level, while the dashed line represents the
long-term welfare level, ¯ Ws(ωh
n), realized by accepting the Northern government’s desired
harmonized enforcement level. Figure 4 indicates that for a relatively high research ca-
pacity in the North (∆ < ∆0
f), the implementation of ωh
n would induce welfare gains in
the South compared to the implementation of its own preferred harmonized enforcement
level, ωh
s. For large values of ∆, however, the South suﬀers welfare losses by implementing
ωh
n rather than ωh
s.
The result that the South gains in welfare from implementing the desired harmonized IPR-
enforcement level of the North can be explained by the Southern government’s limited
time horizon. To illustrate this, we calculate the simple one-shot solution to maximizing
welfare in the South given by (25). That is, the government in the South selects the
the impact of ωh
s on R&D expenditures and proﬁt inﬂows to the North.
37We use the same set of parameters as before: α = 0.3;β = 0.4;λ = 1;λn = 0.78. Details on the
calculations can be obtained upon request.
27global level of IPR-enforcement at t = 0 which is then ﬁxed for all times. The welfare
level realized from the implementation of this enforcement level, which we denote by
ωf
s, is indicated by the dashed dark line in Figure 4.38 Here we directly observe that the
South’s welfare level obtained from the implementation of the North’s desired harmonized
enforcement level approximates the one realized in the full commitment case for ∆ < ∆0
f.
To the contrary, the implementation of ωh
n causes welfare losses for ∆ > ∆0
f, since the
South would set even ωf
s equal to zero. Clearly the intuition is that the government in the
South would enforce IPR stronger if its planning horizon accounted for the entire future
welfare associated with innovations.39 Hence, if the research capacity of the North is
large, accepting the North’s desired level of IPR-enforcement in international negotiation
rounds such as ACTA, would foster long-term welfare in the South. However, the opposite
is true when the research capacity is low, such that ∆ > ∆0
f.
7 Summary and Conclusions
Even though most countries have agreed to harmonize intellectual property rights by sign-
ing TRIPs, there is much dispute about the enforcement of IPR in the world. This paper
examines IPR-enforcement in an endogenous growth framework with two open economies.
We incorporate three assumptions that distinguish our paper from the previous literature
and add realistic features to the model. These are that in each economy all active patents
are enforced at the same (endogenously chosen) strength, the governments cannot fully
commit to IPR-enforcement for the indeﬁnite future and have limited planning horizons,
e.g. due to re-election concerns.
While the governments in the decentralized game provide too little IPR-enforcement rel-
ative to the constrained eﬃcient solution that maximizes the governments’ aggregate
welfare under the previous assumptions, both regions, the North and the South, desire
higher IPR-protection relative to the equilibrium enforcement levels if they were able to
38Note that ωf















The ﬁrst-order condition concerning the (one-shot) full-commitment problem diﬀers from the one with
limited commitment (18) with respect to the second summand which represents the discounted beneﬁt
of a change in IPR-enforcement for all future periods. It follows that the South would prefer a higher
harmonized enforcement level when full commitment were available – i.e., ¯ Ws(ωf
s) > ¯ Ws(ωh
s).
39Note that ωh
s = 0 for ∆ > ∆0
h.
28select a harmonized world enforcement level. Typically, the North’s desired harmonized
enforcement level is larger than the constrained eﬃcient one while that of the South is
lower. The diﬀerence between the North’s and the South’s desired harmonized enforce-
ment levels increases with the relative market size of the South, thus amplifying the clash
of interests in international negotiations. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the smaller a region’s
relative market size, the larger is the diﬀerence between its equilibrium choice and the
ideal harmonized enforcement desired on the international level.
Concerning the discussion whether the South suﬀers welfare losses from adopting the
desired IPR-enforcement levels of the North, our numerical welfare example suggests that
as long as the North’s research capacity is not too low, the South may well beneﬁt in terms
of overall long-term welfare. However, when the research capacity is low, the dynamic
gains realized would not justify the large proﬁt outﬂows even from a long-term welfare
perspective.
It is frequently assumed in the political economy literature as well as in parts of the
dynamic macroeconomic literature that governments act in a short-sighted way. Our pa-
per highlights that such an assumption can change the above results in counterintuitive
ways for very high levels of the North’s research capabilities. In particular the North’s
short-sighted goverment’s IPR-enforcement level in equilibrium and also the desired har-
monized level may decline with its research productivity. As a consequence, the short-
sighted government in the South may choose a higher equilibrium and desired harmonized
enforcement level than the North.
Our paper opens up several avenues for future research. It would be interesting to extend
the enforcement game to one where both regions are active in research and to consider
more than two countries. Further, the framework developed can be used to study several
important aspects of IPR-protection such as blocking patents, diﬀerences in preferences
between the countries or principal-agent problems in R&D joint ventures and their con-
sequences for long-run development.
29A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1





















2ωs − 2(1 − β)∆λ(−(2 − β)D + P) < 0,
H(ωs) = ∆λ[(2 − 3β + β
2)
2D
2 + (1 − β)
2(P




2(λnY − λs(D − P)ωs) > 0.
The signs of G(ωs) and H(ωs) imply that ωn
n2(ωs) is negative for all values ωs ≥ 0. In
contrast, ωn
n1(ωs) can be positive. Hence the latter is the only economically sensible
solution and we deﬁne ωr
n(ωs) ≡ ωn1(ωs).
(ii) Taking the second derivative of ωr











< 0, ∀ωs ≥ 0.
Note that H(ωs) > 0 for all ωs ≥ 0. Thus ωr
n(ωs) is strictly concave.
To show that ωr
n(ωs) is strictly decreasing on [0,1], we use the implicit-function theorem.



















As the monopoly distortion D is negative, the derivative is smaller than zero for all
(ωn,ωs) ∈ R2






























30A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The intuition of the proof can be summarized as follows. First, we show that there is a
unique economically sensible intersection of the reaction functions of the North and the
South. Then we verify that the reaction function of the North intersects the one of the
South from below. This implies that there exists a stable “Cobb-web” mechanism towards
the intersection of the reaction functions. This mechanism leads to a unique equilibrium
which is the intersection of the reaction function itself if the intersection is in the feasible
set. Otherwise it determines a unique equilibrium on the boundary of the feasible set.
(1)
We show that there is a unique economically sensible intersection of the reaction functions
of the North and the South.
Let us deﬁne ωs as the solution to H(ωs) = 0, where H(ωs) is given in the proof of Lemma
1. Since H(ωs) > 0, ∀ωs ≥ 0, we obtain ωs < 0 and that ωr
n(ωs) is a real number for all
ωs > ωs. Further, ωr
n(ωs) is strictly concave on (ωs,∞) according to the proof of Lemma
1. Inserting ωr
s(ωn) given by (10) into Rn(ωn,ωs) yields Re
n(ωn). Solving Re




























+ 2∆λ((3 − β)(2 − β)D − (4 − 3β)P) < 0,
Q2(∆) = (3 − β)
2∆D
2 − 4(3 − 2β)∆DP + P
2(2(2 − β)∆ + β
2Y ) > 0.
Since Q2(∆) > 0, Re
n(ωn) possesses two real roots – i.e., the reaction functions ωr
n(ωs) and
ωr
s(ωn) possess two intersections on the real plane. As Q1(∆) < 0, ωx
n2 is strictly negative
for all relevant parameter values and only ωx




Given a unique ωx
n, we can immediately infer from (10) that ωx
s = ωr
s(ωx
n) is also unique.
(2)
Now, we show that the reaction of the North intersects the one of the South from below.
31We deﬁne ¯ ωs ≡ ωr
s(ωx
n2) and the inverse of the South’s reaction function40
ω
s
















Part (1) of the proof together with strict concavity of ωr
n(ωs) on (ωs,∞) and ωs
n(ωs) being
a strictly decreasing linear function yields the following lemma.
Lemma 3
















s < ωs < ¯ ωs.
(3)
We have to show that
(i) if ωx
n ≤ 0 and ωx
s ≤ 0, the unique equilibrium is (ωn,ωs) = (ˆ ωr
n(0),0).
(ii) if ωx
n ≤ 0 and ωx
s ∈ (0,1), the unique equilibrium is (ωn,ωs) = (0, ˆ ωr
s(0)).
(iii) if ωx
n ≤ 0 and ωx




n ∈ (0,1) and ωx
s ≤ 0, the unique equilibrium is (ωn,ωs) = (ˆ ωr
n(0),0).
(v) if ωx
n ∈ (0,1) and ωx




n ∈ (0,1) and ωx
s ≥ 1, the unique equilibrium is (ωn,ωs) = (ˆ ωr
n(1),1).
(vii) if ωx
n ≥ 1 and ωx




n ≥ 1 and ωx
s ∈ (0,1), the unique equilibrium is (ωn,ωs) = (1, ˆ ωr
s(1)).
(ix) if ωx
n ≥ 1 and ωx
s ≥ 1, the unique equilibrium is (ωn,ωs) = (1,1).
The existence of the equilibrium is established as follows.
(i) Suppose that ωx
n ≤ 0 and ωx
s ≤ 0. Given ωs = 0, the best response of North is ˆ ωr
n(0).
Given ωn = ˆ ωr
n(0), we obtain ωr
s(ωr
n(0)) ≤ 0 by using Lemma 3 and the fact that
ωr
s(ωn) is strictly declining. Consequently, the South’s best response to ωn = ˆ ωr
n(0)
is ωs = 0.
40Note that this is possible as ωs(ωn) is a bijection.
32(ii) Suppose that ωx
n ≤ 0 and ωx
s ∈ (0,1). Given ωs = ˆ ωr
s(0), then best response of
North is 0 because ωr
n(ˆ ωr
s(0)) ≤ 0 due to ωr
s(ωn) being a strictly declining function
and Lemma 3. Given ωn = 0, the South’s best response is ˆ ωr
s(0).
(iii) Suppose that ωx
n ≤ 0 and ωx
s ≥ 1. We distinguish the cases where ωr
n(1) ≤ 0
and ωr
n(1) > 0. If ωr
n(1) ≤ 0, the equilibrium can be written as (ωn,ωs) =
(0, ˆ ωr
s(0)). ωr
n(1) ≤ 0 together with Lemma 3 and ωr
s(ωn) strictly declining im-
plies that ωr
n(ˆ ωr
s(0)) ≤ 0. Hence, the best response of the North is ωn = 0. Further,
given ωn = 0, ˆ ωr
s(0) is the best response of the South.
If ωr
n(1) > 0, the equilibrium can be written as (ωn,ωs) = (ˆ ωr
n(1),1). Given ωs = 1,
ˆ ωr
n(1) is best response of North. ωr
n(1) > 0 together with Lemma 3 and ωr
s(ωn)
strictly declining imply ωr
s(ωr
n(1)) ≥ 1. Consequently, the South’s best response is
ωs = 1.
(iv) Suppose that ωx
n ∈ (0,1) and ωx
s ≤ 0. Given ωs = 0, the best response of North is
ˆ ωr
n(0). Given ωn = ˆ ωr
n(0), ωr
s(ωr
n(0)) ≤ 0 follows from Lemma 3 and ωr
s(ωn) being a
strictly declining function. Hence, the South’s best response is ωs = 0.
(v) Let ωx
n ∈ (0,1) and ωx
s ∈ (0,1). Then (ωn,ωs) = (ωx
n,ωx
s) is an equilibrium by the
deﬁnition of the reaction functions.
(vi) Let ωx
n ∈ (0,1) and ωx
s ≥ 1. Given ωs = 1, the best response of North is ˆ ωr
n(1).
Given ωn = ˆ ωr
n(1), the South’s best response is ωs = 1 as ωr
s(ωr
n(1)) ≥ 1 due to
Lemma 3 and ωr
s(ωn) being a strictly declining function.
(vii) Suppose that ωx
n ≥ 1 and ωx
s ≤ 0. We distinguish the cases where ωr
n(0) ≤ 1 and
ωr
n(0) > 1. If ωr
n(0) ≤ 1, the equilibrium can be written as (ωn,ωs) = (ˆ ωr
n(0),0).
Given ωs = 0, ˆ ωr
n(0) is best response of the North. Due to Lemma 3 and ωr
s(ωn) being
a strictly declining function, ωr
s(ωr
n(0)) ≤ 0. Consequently, South’s best response is
ωs = 0.
If ωr
n(0) > 1, the equilibrium can be written as (ωn,ωs) = (1, ˆ ωr
s(1)). ωr
n(0) > 1
together with Lemma 3 and ωr
s(ωn) being a strictly declining function implies that
ωr
n(ˆ ωr
s(1)) ≥ 1. Hence, the best response of the North is ωn = 1. Further, given
ωn = 1, ˆ ωr
s(1) is the best response of the South.
(viii) Suppose that ωx
n ≥ 1 and ωx
s ∈ (0,1). Given ωs = ˆ ωr
s(1), Lemma 3 and ωr
s(ωn)
strictly declining imply that ωr
n(ˆ ωr
s(1)) ≥ 1. Consequently, the North’s best response
is ωn = 1. Given ωn = 1, the South’s best response is ωs = ˆ ωr
s(1).
33(ix) Let ωx
n ≥ 1 and ωx




n ≥ 1 and ωx
s ≥ 1 implies that ωr
n(ωs),ωs
n(ωs) ≥ 1 for all ωs ∈ [0,1] and
ωr
s(ωn) ≥ 1 for all ωn ∈ [0,1]. Consequently, given ωs = 1, ωr
n(1) ≥ 1 leading to
ωn = 1 as the best response of the North. Given ωn = 1, the best response of the
South is ωs = 1 as ωr
s(1) ≥ 1.
(4)
Concerning uniqueness, Lemma 3 and the fact that ωr
s(ωn) and ωs
n(ωs) are strictly declin-
ing functions imply that ∀ωs ∈ [0,1] and ωs  = ωe
s, we have ˆ ωr
s(ˆ ωr
n(ωs))  = ωs. Further
∀ωn ∈ [0,1] and ωn  = ωe
n, we obtain ˆ ωr
n(ˆ ωr
s(ωn))  = ωn. As a consequence, the equilibrium
(ωn,ωs) = (¯ ωx
n,ωe
s) as given in Proposition 2 is unique. 2
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
















+ 2∆λ((3 − β)(2 − β)D − (4 − 3β)P) < 0,
Q2(∆) = (3 − β)
2∆D
2 − 4(3 − 2β)∆DP + P
2(2(2 − β)∆ + β
2Y ) > 0.
The second derivative of ωx









Concerning the convexity of the South’s IPR-level in ∆, we use equation (10) and take

















d∆2 must be positive and hence, ωx
s is strictly convex in ∆. 2
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
To verify the three items of Proposition 3, it is necessary to show that ωx
s is strictly
convex and declining with ∆, while ωx
n is strictly concave and exhibits an inverted U-
shaped relation with ∆. Then determining the roots of ωx
s and ωx





n yields condition (14).
34Item (i) of Proposition 3 follows from the properties of ωx
s mentioned above. For Item (ii)
it is necessary to additionally show that ωr
n(0) (i.e., the North’s IPR-enforcement level in
autarky) is strictly concave in ∆ and intersects with ωx
n from above at ∆0(≡ ∆0
s). Since
ωe
n is identical to ωx
n for all ∆ < ∆0 and identical to ωr
n(0) for all ∆ ≥ ∆0, this implies that
ωe
n is strictly concave and shows an inverted U-shape over the entire relevant interval, but
is – of course – not diﬀerentiable at ∆0. Item (iii) follows from the properties of ωx
n and
ωx
s given that condition (14) is satisﬁed.
The proof is organized as follows. First, we derive ωr
s(0) and ωs
n(0) as well as some notation
and lemmata that will be used throughout the proof. Then, we show the existence of ∆0
n
and that condition (14) is necessary and suﬃcient for ∆0
s < ∆0
n. In the remainder of the












Figure 5: Illustration of the proof of Proposition 3
From the South’s reaction function (10), we obtain the values of IPR-protection in the

























Now, consider the level of IPR-protection of the North such that the South would just
choose a zero level of protection. This corresponds to the inverse of ωr
s(ωn) at the point
ωs = 0 – i.e.,
ω
s














n(0) deﬁnes a line in the ω − ∆ coordinate plane that intersects with ωr
s(0) at ∆s
m.
Let us now consider Re
n(ωn), which is derived by inserting ωr
s(ωn) as given by (10) into
the ﬁrst-order condition of the North (13). From the ﬁrst part of the proof of Proposition
2, we know that Re
n(ωn) possesses two real roots, ωx
n1 and ωx
n2. The economically sensible
one is the larger root ωx
n1 implying ωx
n ≡ ωx
n1. By showing that Re
n(ωn) is strictly concave,
we establish
Lemma 4
(i) ∀ ωn > ωx
n2, Re









































































This veriﬁes Lemma 4. 2
The level of IPR-protection of the North when the South chooses ωs = 0 is given by








 2 P 2
4∆
< 0, (A.8)










































λn) = 4∆ λ
λn(1 − β)D(D − P) + P 2∆ λ
λn + β2(Y P 2 + D2∆ λ
λn) > 0. Only ωa
n1
is economically sensible. Hence we deﬁne the level of IPR-protection of the North when
the South provides no IPR-protection by ωa
n ≡ ωa
n1. Using the same line of argument as
with regard to Lemma 4, we are now able to formulate:
36Lemma 5
(i) ∀ ω > ωa













n > 0 and ωx
n > 0 at ∆s





Proof. The condition that ωx
n > 0 and ωa
n > 0 at ∆s
m is equivalent to Re
n(0) > 0 and
Rn(0,0) > 0 at ∆s
m according to Lemmata 4 and 5. Inserting ∆s
m given in equation (A.6)
into Re
n(0) > 0 and Rn(0,0) > 0 yields
R
e
n(0) > 0 ⇔ Rn(0,0) > 0 ⇔ −











Let us now establish
Lemma 7
ωx
n possesses a unique maximum at ∆c.




























, ∆ > 0,






dωn < 0 at ωn = ωx






2(2 − β)2 −
 
βP
βP(λsY − λnωn(D − P))









∂∆ = 0, for which
∂Re
n(ωn)
∂∆ > (<) 0 if and only if ωn > (<) ωn,crit. ωn,crit


























Considering (A.9b) and the strict concavity of ωx
n, we can directly infer that there will be
a unique intersection of ωx
n and ωn,crit at a ∆ > 0 which we call ∆c. Due to the deﬁnition
of ωn,crit, this intersection is at the maximum of ωx
n in ∆. 2
Using the same line of argument as in Lemma 7, it can be shown that
Lemma 8
ωa
n is strictly concave in ∆ and there exists a ∆crit > 0 where it possesses a unique
maximum.
The proof will be provided upon request. Now we are able to show the existence of ∆0
n.
Lemma 9
There exists a ∆0
n such that ωe
n = 0 for all ∆ ≥ ∆0
n.
To establish the existence of ∆0





s. In the ﬁrst case, existence of a ∆0
n > ∆0
s requires that ωa
n ≤ 0 for all ∆
larger than a certain threshold value. Consider ﬁrst the IPR-level in autarky ωa
n. Due to




d∆ < 0 for all ∆ > ∆crit (see Lemma 8, there exists
a threshold of ∆ where ωa
n ≤ 0 for all ∆ larger than this threshold.
A threshold level ∆0
n ≤ ∆0
s requires that ωx
n ≤ 0 for all ∆ larger than a certain threshold
value. Such a threshold value of ∆ exists since ωx









s if and only if λn
λs > D
D−P.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for ∆0
n > ∆0
s is that ωa
n > 0 at ∆s
m. This condition
is suﬃcient as ∆0
s is smaller than or equal to ∆s
m.41 The condition is necessary because
if ωa
n < 0 at ∆s
m then ωa
n < 0 for all ∆ ≥ ∆s
m. Further we know from Lemma 6, that
ωx
n < 0 at ∆s
m if and only if ωa
n < 0 at ∆s




m follows from ωe
s ≤ ωr
s(0) because ωs is a strategic substitute to ωn and ωn ≥ 0 in
equilibrium.
38which ωx
s > 0 and that ∆0
s = ∆s
m. Consequently, ωa
n > 0 at ∆s
m is necessary for ∆0
n > ∆0
s.
According to Lemma 6, ωa
n > 0 at ∆s





Next we verify items (i)-(iii) of Proposition 3
(i): ωe
s is strictly declining for the following reason. Since λn
λs > D
D−P holds by assumption,
ωx
n > 0 at the point ∆s
m. This implies that ωx
s = ωr
s(ωx
n) is negative at ∆s
m. Further, ωx
s
must be smaller than or equal to ωr
s(0) if ωx
n ≥ 0. According to Lemma 2, ωx
s is strictly
convex. It follows from (A.9a) that ωx
s > 0 for some ∆ < ∆s
m. This, together with ωx
s < 0
at ∆s
m implies that ωe
s possesses a unique root ∆0 in the relevant interval [0,∆s
m] and is

















s is (weakly) decreasing and positive for all ∆ < ∆0.
To verify that the equilibrium enforcement of the South takes the corner solution ωe
s = 0
for all ∆ larger then ∆0, we have to consider ωa
n which indicates the North’s best response
to ωs = 0. Only if ωa
n > ωs
n(0) for all ∆ ∈ (∆0,∆s
m), will the South choose ωe
s = 0 for all
∆ ≥ ∆0. Since ωa
n = ωx
n = ωs
n(0) at ∆0, ωa
n is strictly concave in ∆, and ωa
n > 0 at ∆s
m,
ωa
n does not intersect ωs
n(0) in the interval ∆ ∈ (∆0,∆s
m).
(ii): As ωe
s = 0 for all ∆ > ∆0, the North acts as if in autarky because in this case there
are no proﬁt inﬂows from the South and, hence, neither are there additional incentives to
conduct R&D in the North. Accordingly the government in the North acts as if λs = 0
and λn = λ.
The inverted U-shape of ωe
n follows from the following line of argument. According to
the previously established lemmata, both ωx
n and ωa
n are strictly concave and follow an
inverted U-shape in ∆. ωe
n combines ωx
n for ∆ < ∆0 and ωa
n for ∆ > ∆0. ωx
n and ωa
n
intersect at ∆0 and ωx
n > ωa
n for ∆ > ∆0 while ωx
n < ωa
n for ∆ < ∆0. The strict concavity
of both ωx
n and ωa






∂∆ . Now it follows directly
that ωe
n is concave and exhibits an inverted U-shaped form on the interval of ∆ where
ωe
n > 0.
(iii): According to Lemma 2, ωx
n is strictly concave in ∆. Further, we have lim∆→0 ωx
n < 0
according to (A.9a). From ωx
n > 0 at ∆s
m (Lemma 6), we infer that ωx
n > 0 at ∆0. ωx
s is
strictly convex and strictly declining on [0,∆0]. Further, ωx
s = 0 at ∆0. As a consequence,
there is exactly one intersection ωx
n and ωx
s on [0,∆0]. Denoting the value of ∆ at the
39intersection by ∆x, we obtain directly that for all ∆ < ∆x, ωx
s > ωx
n and for all




A.5 Proof of Proposition 4





























∆(β2Y P 2 + ∆((3 − β)2D2 − 4(3 − 2β)DP + 2(2 − β)P 2 < 0.
2
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
First we show that ωx
n increases with λn
λs and, thereafter, that ωx
s decreases with λn
λs.
Finally, we verify that the growth rate is invariant with λn
λs given ∆.
1. Let us consider Re
n(ωn), which is derived by inserting ωr
s(ωn) as given by (10) into
the ﬁrst-order condition of the North (13). As shown in the ﬁrst part of the proof
of Proposition 2, Re
n(ωn) possesses two real roots, of which only the larger one is
economically sensible and is denoted by ωx



































n < 0 by
42Details on how ωx
n is derived can be found in the extended appendix of the (Sch¨ afer and Schneider,
2011).
40verifying that Re
n(ωn) is strictly concave.43 Re








































































   
 
λ
. For the derivative of Re
n(ωn) with respect to λn given the total









βP(Y + ωn(D − P))
4∆(2 − β)2λ2(D − P)2 [2∆λ(D − P)((3 − β)(2 − β)D
−(4 − 3β)P) + β
2P
2(λsY − λnωn(D − P))
 
. (A.12)









Hence, if we have an interior solution where ωe
n ∈ (0,1), the North’s IPR-enforcement
level strictly increases with its relative eﬀective market size.
2. We insert λs = λ−λn into (10) and take the derivative with respect to λn given the




















































This veriﬁes that the South (at an interior solution) also increases IPR-enforcement
if its relative market size increases.








n as given by (A.11), ωx
s and substituting λs by λ−λn, we obtain for the








43This follows from the facts mentioned above: that Re
n(ωn) possesses two real roots and ωx
n is the
larger one of the two.
41A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
The proof ﬁrst shows that there is a unique solution to the North’s optimization problem.
Then we show that the desired harmonized enforcement level ωh
n is strictly concave in ∆
by verifying that the second derivative is negative. The derivative of ωh
n with respect to ∆
is always positive if the condition given in Item (i) of Proposition 7 is satisﬁed. Otherwise
the derivative will change its sign for larger values of ∆ implying an inverted U-shaped
relation between ωh
n and ∆. This veriﬁes Item (ii) of Proposition 7. With respect to Item
(iii), we ﬁrst show that ωh
n increases (decreases) with its relative eﬀective market size if
ωh
n < (>)ωh
s. Using the properties of ωh
n and ωh
s on the relevant interval of ∆, we show
that there exists a unique ¯ ∆ such that ωh
n > (<)ωh
s if and only if ∆ > (<)¯ ∆. This proves
Item (iii) of Proposition 7.
(1)
We show that there is a unique solution to the North’s optimization problem. In this ﬁrst




n. These will be useful to verify Items (i) – (iii) of Proposition 7.




n) is a strictly concave function and strictly declining on R+.
Proof. Consider the function Rh
n(ωh
n) as given by (20). Rh
n(ωh
n) is strictly concave because






































n < 0 if the ﬁrst two summands together are negative.






















1−β > 2 and 1
1−β > 1 for all β ∈ (0,1), the second-order condition of the govern-
ment’s problem, (A.16), is stronger than condition (A.15). That is, all values of
λs
λn that
satisfy the second-order condition (A.16) will also satisfy (A.15). Hence, for the relevant
parameter set satisfying condition (A.16), Rh
n(ωh
n) is strictly concave, it must be declining
with ωh
n on R+. 2
Rh
n(ωh







∆((1 − β)(D +
λs
λn











∆((1 − β)(D +
λs
λn





where Q3(∆) = β2 λ






λnP)P + ((1−β)(D +
λs
λnP)+ D − P)2 
. Since
only real roots may possess economic meaning in our context, we restrict ourselves to the
case where Q3(∆) > 0. Then it follows that only ωh
n1 may assume positive values while
ωh




The North’s desired harmonized IPR-level ωh
n possesses the following properties.
Lemma 12
(a) ωh







Proof. (a) The second derivative of ωh










This veriﬁes the concavity of ωh
n.
Item (b) can be observed directly in equation (A.17).
(c) The derivative of ωh









(1 − β)(D +
λs
λn






where Q4(∆) = β2 λ
λnY P 2−2∆(1−β−β λ
λn)(D+ λs
λnP)+D)P+P 2. Since lim∆→0 ∆Q3(∆) =
0, it depends on the sign of lim∆→0Q4(∆) whether the limit of
∂ωh
n
∂∆ at ∆ = 0 will be plus
or minus inﬁnity. We obtain c) as lim∆→0 Q4(∆) > 0.
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n is negative according to Lemma 11. Consequently, the sign of
dωh
n























d∆ < 0 if and only if







The right hand side of (A.18) is clearly negative. Thus if Dλn + Pλs > 0, which is
equivalent to λn
λs > −P
D, condition (A.18) is not satisﬁed and we obtain
dωh
n
d∆ > 0. This
proves (i).
With respect to (ii), suppose that λn
λs > −P





d∆ > (<)0 if and only if ωh
n > (<)ωc















Equation (A.19) reveals that ωc
n is a linear function of ∆ with a positive ﬁnite slope and
lim∆→0ωc
n = 0. Together with the properties of ωh
n as given in Lemma 12, we can conclude
that there exists a unique ∆m > 0 such that
dωh
n
d∆ > 0 for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆m) and
dωh
n
d∆ o < 0 for
all ∆ > ∆m. This veriﬁes claim (ii).
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if and only if ωh
n < (>)ωc′
n. Since (A.20) is identical to the ﬁrst-order condition to the
South’s maximization problem, ωc′
n is identical to ωh
s. Further, we deﬁne ∆ as the level
of research productivity relative to total eﬀective market size where ωh







s is declining with ∆ (see (18)), ∆ > 0 implies that ωh
s > 0 at ∆ = 0. It follows
that ωh
n < ωh
s for small values of ∆ according to the properties of ωh
n as described in
Lemma 12. Since ωh
n is strictly concave in ∆, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
existence of a ¯ ∆ such that ωh
n < (>)ωh
s for all ∆ < (>) ¯ ∆ is that ωh
n > ωh
s (= 0) at ∆.
By a similar line of argument as in the proof of Lemma 4, we can infer from Lemma 11
that ωh
n > 0 at ∆ if and only if Rh









This veriﬁes that ωh
n and ωh
s possess exactly one intersection where ωh
n,ωh
s > 0. We denote
the value of ∆ at this intersection by ¯ ∆. It now follows directly that
dωh
n
dλn < (>)0 for all
∆ > (<) ¯ ∆. 2
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
The proof of Proposition 8 follows directly from the last part of the proof of Proposition
7, where we have shown that ωh
n and ωh
s possess a unique intersection where both ωh
n and
ωh
s are greater than zero. ¯ ∆ is the level of ∆ at this intersection. It follows further from
the proof of Proposition 7 that ωh
n < ωh
s if ∆ < ¯ ∆ and ωh
n > ωh
s if ∆ > ¯ ∆. 2
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